32. Designer Notes
The following section contains some designer notes and thoughts on various topics covered in the game. These items pair well with the information in FM02 Battlefield Primer and add more background to the various features and capabilities of the game engine.
32.1 Infantry
Infantry units perform best when dug in and in areas with plenty of cover. In built-up areas like cities, infantry can take down unsupported tanks. In the open, infantry becomes very vulnerable to all types of fire. Digging infantry out of high cover can be a real chore and usually requires the use of artillery as well as infantry to remove as this is an intentional and protective position that was built.
32.2 Planning
However accurate it may be that plans don’t survive contact with the enemy, maneuvers must be carefully pre-planned. The operational commander can expect to feel more like a traffic cop than a battlefield commander of WWII vintage once maneuvering has begun. This is as it should be, however. Victory can depend on units getting to the same place at the same time. Traffic jams are gifts to opposing air and artillery forces (only one company-sized maneuver element fits easily in one map location – 35 subunits for NATO and 70 subunits for Warsaw Pact per hex in this game). Hostile helicopters love giant traffic jams and are incredibly effective at destroying them. Game scenarios with smaller forces tend to have fewer traffic jams than scenarios with larger forces if this is something you would like to practice.
In addition to the requirement to pre-plan, players must remain flexible to meet the rapidly changing situations common in modern combat. The reason for this necessity is a lack of information. It is rare to know precisely where the enemy is, what they have, or what their objectives are during setup while you are making plans. A good plan incorporates accurate guesses as to these points, does not depend too crucially upon those guesses, and includes methods to improve your intelligence on the enemy while denying them similar intelligence. Field reconnaissance will often result in the loss of the units performing recon so it is best to arrange your forces so that recon is not performed inadvertently by valuable non-reconnaissance units.
32.3 Mobility
Combat occurs “over the ground” not “for the ground”. Despite the perils of tactical movement, units need to be constantly engaged in operational movement. Enemy units can be easily fixed in place with suppressive fires and kept out of battle once identified in a particular location. There are few “must have” locations to defend – so the objective is to find and defeat enemy combat units, not seize nor hold ground for the sake of it.
32.4 Tempo
Modern combat occurs around the clock. Multiple layers are needed to sustain the necessary level of commitment. Each layer works its way to the front in turn, engages, and then disengages to rest and replenish. The idea is to seize the initiative, set the tempo of combat at a level higher than the enemy can sustain, and then dislocate them with fresh units when their forces inevitably crack. A fast but sloppy solution in these circumstances trumps a well-ordered but slower solution. The other implication is that there is no time to learn on the job. All units must be fully trained in peacetime because there will be no time once the shooting starts.
32.5 Initiative
Players should not wait until they engage the enemy before exercising their command initiative because by then it will be too late. Make most of your decisions and give many of your orders before even hitting start. Things like combat doctrine and reporting structures should not usually be changed during play. This reflects reality. In Cold War combat, a lot of destruction happens very quickly. This means there is no time for a battalion or brigade commander to assess the situation, decide, and choose a course of action once the shooting has started.
32.6 Recon and Intel
This is a game in which to be located by your opponent is often fatal so you will wish to either stay well-hidden or to keep on the move. The latter will usually be necessary. In moving it is good to remember, especially for large forces on roads, that there are stacking limits. You cannot get much more than a single large, full-strength company into one location. NATO forces can stack about 35 subunits total in one game hex while Warsaw Pact forces can stack about 70 subunits. Attacks have broken down in play testing due to traffic jams. Locating one of your traffic jams is an enemy dream. Every remote delivery weapon (and a few direct fire ones) will end up trying to clear out that traffic problem for you so they are best to avoid. Ideally, the main task for your ground units will be to pick off enemies easily in such a jammed location, having already had the air force and artillery do all the dirty work of getting them to fragile states.
Targeting enemy traffic jams from the air is more effective and a lot safer than wading into a head-on ground engagement oneself. Unfortunately, it is not always possible for events to work out so cleanly so it will probably be necessary to engage the enemy with your ground forces at some point. When doing so, keep in mind that snoopers tend to get shot at. Determining opposing strength locations with your HQ or main elements is not good practice. That is what reconnaissance is for. You will often find that they merely present you with a flaming datum, but better them than your staff vehicle.
32.7 Survival
Complete units should not disappear in just a couple of minutes except in catastrophically adverse circumstances. Rarely should the voluntary loss rate exceed one vehicle per minute. All combatants are assumed to have residual survival instincts and will modify their behavior once they come under fire to reflect this. They will not press on suicidally, but instead will suffer a mission abort once the rate of loss passes a certain threshold – which can be aggravated by the loss of HQ vehicles. They will retire to the nearest safe location and reorganize for another attempt. Exception: the less realistically trained the troops are, the more “dash” behaviour (voluntary risk assumption) they can be expected to show. Virtually all troops in Soviet-style units fall into this category initially.
32.8 Artillery
Artillery support is crucial but limited. Demand far outstrips supply. A frontal attack on an unsuppressed defense no matter the odds will likely result in ruin. Artillery must be used to prepare the way and then support the attack. The dilemma is that artillery has notable supply limitations and cannot be used lavishly except for the very highest priority tasks. Five minutes of moderate firing per location ought to be considered lavish. On the modern battlefield, quality of fire support counts more than quantity and the destruction of units through fire alone should be considered most unlikely. Counter-battery fire is an important role and a substantial fraction (¼ to ⅓) should be assigned to it. The same rules apply to air strikes, only more so.
32.9 Lethality
This is the age of the empty battlefield. If you can see it, you can probably kill it. Western-style units will stay hidden unless forced otherwise by movement orders. During movement, they will seek to use all available cover and move in short high-speed dashes to minimize exposure. If adequate cover is unavailable, smoke will be used generously. As in times past, the best movement route is the most covered route, not the shortest route. Warsaw Pact units put a higher premium on cohesion and predictability. They will be much less likely to take advantage of available cover in most circumstances.
32.10 Ammunition
Ammunition is relatively bulky, heavy, and scarce. Most units can fire off everything they carry in 10 minutes or less and yet they need to be able to go eight hours or more. This tends to discourage high-volume, low-payoff exchanges. Assume that the intensity half-range is 500 m. Units generally shoot with 4x intensity at targets within that range, 2x from 500 to 1000 m, and 1x beyond that. There is also a sniping/harassment level of fire that can occur at extreme ranges to keep the other side honest, but this need not be simulated at the company level. Both sides have stockpiled enormous quantities of ammunition and other supplies, and experience has shown that it is used up at far higher than expected rates. Expect severe supply difficulties within 30 days for both sides and potentially crippling shortages of critical items within 10 days. This cannot be a long war.
32.11 Dispersion
In the age of ultra-lethal weapons, dispersion is the key to survival. Historically, troop densities have dropped every time weapon lethality increases. The concentration of units in a contained area is an invitation to wholesale destruction, yet attacks must concentrate to a degree to achieve success. Move dispersed, attack concentrated!
32.12 Line of Sight and Line of Fire
Typical combat ranges may be a lot shorter than expected. Most improvements to direct fire weapons have been to extend the range past 3 km but in most cases, the line of fire will not be nearly that long. At one point, the Soviets calculated that 50% of all combat would occur at 500 m or less. This puts a premium on delivering the first round quickly and accurately rather than at an extended range. Tactical situational awareness leading to consistently getting the first shot in may well determine who lives and who dies. The best shot might not be the longest shot, or the one with the most sweeping field of view, but rather the most unexpected shot.
And with that, we wish you luck!